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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Parties to an arbitration agreement can rest assured (or be dismayed) that
another aspect of "arbitrability" remains in the hands of an arbitrator and not
the courts. In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court
decided that issues of time-limit rules barring arbitrability are matters for the
arbitrator to determine, not the judiciary. 1
In disputes over arbitration clauses, a question often exists as to whether
the arbitrator or the courts should decide matters. In First Options v. Kaplan,
the Supreme Court held that the expressed intent of the parties determines
who decides issues of arbitrability.2 The decision by parties to submit to an
arbitration agreement essentially means that they waive their right to the
courts.3 Thus, if the contract clearly expresses the intent of the parties to
submit all questions to the arbitrator, the courts must defer to this judgment.4
However, when such intent is unclear from the terms of the contract, courts
are not required to grant such deference to the arbitrator. 5 Of special
importance is the situation in which the parties have not clearly delineated
who decides arbitrability issues, that is, whether or not the parties are able to
arbitrate at all. Where there is no clear statement that an arbitrator should
confront issues of arbitrability, this decision is left to the courts. 6 With its
decision in Howsam, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the ambiguity
surrounding the meaning of arbitrability and the balance of power between
the courts and arbitrators. 7
* Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
1Id. at 81.





7 Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56
SMU L. REV. 819, 862 (2003).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Karen Howsam claimed that Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. ("Dean Witter")
advised her to purchase interests in four limited partnerships. 8 Howsam
determined this advice was flawed and moved to challenge Dean Witter for
misrepresenting the value of the investments. 9 Under the contract between
Howsam and Dean Witter, all controversies had to be submitted to
arbitration.1 0 Howsam, as the client, selected the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) as the arbitration body. 11 Howsam agreed to the
NASD's Uniform Submission Agreement, which stated that the matter must
proceed in accordance with the NASD's "Code of Arbitration Procedure."12
Included in the Code was a clause providing that no issue may be brought
before the NASD "where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or
event giving rise to the.., dispute."' 3
After Howsam signed the Uniform Submission Agreement, Dean Witter
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 14
Dean Witter asked the court to deny Howsam the opportunity to arbitrate
because the matter occurred more than six years previous.' 5 The District
Court determined that the arbitrator should decide whether the time limit had
elapsed, not the court. 16 Dean Witter appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. 17 The Tenth Circuit reversed, stating that the NASD rule
involved a question of "arbitrability" which is a matter to be decided by a
court, not the arbitrator. 18 Howsam appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court. 19 Because the Courts of Appeals were split on the question, the Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the court or the arbitrator should
determine the application of this NASD rule.20
8 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 82.
12Id.





18 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 958 (2001).
19 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81.
20 Id. at 83.
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111. THE COURT'S DECISION AND REASONING
The Supreme Court held that arbitrators, not the courts, should apply the
NASD time limit provision.21 Thus, the Court settled the dispute among the
Courts of Appeals as to who decides this rule.22
The Court reached this decision by determining that the NASD time limit
rule did not constitute a "question of arbitrability," which would make it a
matter to be determined by the courts.23 This decision followed the Court's
view that parties who agree to arbitrate generally agree that decisions will be
made by the arbitrator, not the courts. 24
A. Defining a Question of Arbitrability
Although the Court states that courts typically favor the use of
arbitration, there are certain instances when an arbitration clause may be
abrogated due to problems with its terms. 25 The scope of arbitrability is
limited to situations in which the parties "would likely have expected a court
to have decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought
that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so."'26 To force such parties
to take "gateway" issues to an arbitrator would mean forcing the parties to
arbitrate when they may not have contractually agreed to do so. 27 The Court
has previously addressed questions of arbitrability relating to whether or not
the arbitration contract binds parties who were not signatories to the
agreement, 28 whether arbitration clauses survive corporate mergers, 29 and




23 Id. at 85.
24 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
25 Id. at 83.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960); First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-943 (1995)).
29 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 546-547 (1964)).
30 Id. (citing AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651-652
(1986); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-243 (1962)).
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B. Arbitrability Versus Questions of Procedure
Questions of arbitrability are the types of questions that determine
whether or not the parties actually agreed to arbitrate and whether the parties
in question are bound to do so.31 Questions of procedure, however, are for
the arbitrator to decide. 32 The Court has determined that questions regarding
"waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability" are procedural. 33 The
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) further states that the "arbitrator
shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been
fulfilled... such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions
precedent. ' '34
C. Labeling the NASD Rule
The Court determined that the NASD time limit rule more closely
resembles a question of procedure than a question of arbitrability.35 Using
the "waiver, delay, or like defense" notion found in Moses Cone, combined
with the comments to the RUAA, the Court held that the rule should be
applied and interpreted by the arbitrator.36 In addition to its similarity with
procedural questions approved previously by the Court, the NASD rule is
better applied by expert arbitrators working under the NASD system as
opposed to judges. 37 Unless something in the contract expressly states
otherwise, the Court stated it is "reasonable to infer that the parties intended
the agreement to reflect" the understanding that arbitrators will interpret and
apply rules governing arbitration.38
To further bolster the view that the parties intended to be bound by the
NASD rules as applied by NASD arbitrators, the Court points to NASD Code
section 10324 which states that "arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret
and determine the applicability of all provisions under this [NASD] Code." 39
By executing the Uniform Submission Agreement, Howsam and Dean Witter
31 Id. at 83.
3 2 Id. at 84.
33 Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983)).
34 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added) (citing REv. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 6,
comment 2, 7 U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2000))




39 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86 (citing NASD Code § 10324).
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"effectively incorporated the NASD Code into [their] agreement. '40
Therefore, the parties intended to be bound by the NASD Code in its
entirety. 4'
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE HOWSAM DECISION
The Howsam decision set out to clarify the boundaries of several of the
Court's past decisions regarding contract interpretation in the area of
arbitration clauses. Whether the decision effectively accomplishes this goal is
somewhat unclear. First, the definitions of "substantive arbitrability" and
"procedural arbitrability" are still left somewhat vague. Second, the decision
furthers the presumption in favor of arbitration without addressing the
problems of inadequate legal training in the ADR field and the growing
complexity of arbitration in corporate America. Finally, the Court entirely
ignores the issue of waiver of judicial access, thus leaving this area of law
open to debate.
A. The Howsam Rule-Defining Arbitrability
In its previous First Options decision, the Court left open the definition
of "arbitrability" as it pertains to questions of procedure.42 The lower courts
had split as to how to characterize the time-limit rule.43 Five circuits had
determined that the time-limit rule presented a question of eligibility for
arbitration, and thus, should be decided by the courts.44 Five circuits
determined that the rule was more like a statute of limitations, thus a
procedural question. 45 First Options could be read to include questions of
procedure under the larger banner of "arbitrability," thus creating a system
where all questions go before the courts.46 Howsam served to end this debate
by declaring that questions of procedure did not relate to arbitrability, and
thus, did not fall into the First Options analysis.47
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Reuben, supra note 7, at 864.
43 Id. at 863.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 865.
47 Id.
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The Court held that unless parties expressly claim otherwise, questions
of arbitrability are to be decided by the court.48 The Court then attempts to
define "questions of arbitrability" by stating that "procedural questions" are
not subject to judicial determination because they do not determine whether
the parties are "bound by a given arbitration clause," 49 rather, they "grow out
of the dispute and bear on its final disposition." 50 Part of the determination as
to whether a question is procedural in nature is the notion that the parties
would have expected the issue to be resolved by the arbitrator, not the
courts. 51 Thus, the Court clearly preserves the idea of procedural arbitrability
as opposed to substantive arbitrability, but only vaguely defines the
boundaries of each. 52
The Court determined that a time limit is a type of condition
precedent to arbitrability, thus, a matter for the arbitrator to decide.53 For this
much of the Howsam analysis, the Court is clearly correct. However, the
other factor in determining procedural versus substantive questions looks to
the parties' intent.54 In the case of Karen Howsam and Dean Witter, it is
unclear that the parties were even aware of the time limit issue at the time
they contracted, much less whether they would have assumed an arbitrator
would decide the issue. The legal wrangling between these parties went
through several stages, and the time limit policy adopted by NASD was not
part of the original agreement. Strictly speaking, the NASD provisions were
adopted into the original agreement, thus making them part of the contract
between Howsam and Dean Witter. However, whether the parties would
have agreed to the time limit term had they been aware of it at the time of the
original agreement is uncertain. Thus, their intent and motivation are unclear.
B. Presumptions in Favor of Arbitrability
Perhaps the rule announced in Howsam would be more easily linked to
the facts of the case had the contract between the parties been more
straightforward, that is, outlining arbitration policies rather than merely
referencing trade policies. Law schools today infrequently teach ADR
48 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (citing AT&T, 475 U.S. at 649).
49 Id. at 84.
50 Id. (citing John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 557).
51 Id. at 83.
52 Reuben, supra note 7, at 965. "One may reasonably question whether the Court's
new nomenclature will engender more confusion than clarification... [blut it settles the
law to know both that the procedural arbitrability doctrine is still viable, and perhaps
more important, how it is to be treated analytically in the post-First Options regime." Id.
53 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
54 Id. at 83.
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techniques in contracts courses. 55 This leads to the question: should the
courts place so much trust in the ability of attorneys to draft contracts when
the attorneys have little or no knowledge of the ADR procedures?
An argument is made that the reason courts almost unilaterally enforce
arbitration agreements is to decrease the court's docket by forcing cases into
non-judicial processes.56 However, modern arbitrations can often involve
millions of dollars and affect the fates of large corporations as well as
individual investors. 57 Given the fact that the parties' intent matters when
courts interpret arbitration clauses, 58 combined with many attorneys' lack of
ADR experience and the large amounts of money that may be involved, it is
valid to argue that the Court should increase its oversight of contract
interpretation in the ADR field, as opposed to granting presumptions in favor
of ADR.59
Despite the argument that the courts bend over backwards to
accommodate arbitration clauses, the argument also exists that Howsam
served to cement the specific role of the courts in determining whether
parties must arbitrate. 60 The majority opinion in Howsam attempted to set a
clear boundary as to what types of questions the courts will decide in order to
prevent future litigation of this type of matter. 61 However, this bright line test
is undermined by later language that seems to promote the idea that the more
expert decisionmaker should decide issues, rather than delineating the issues
into procedural or substantive matters.62 The two sections can be resolved.
The dispute in Howsam did not center on whether the parties had agreed to
arbitrate, rather, it only involved whether Howsam was able to bring a claim
55 Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Negotiating and Drafting the Agreement to Arbitrate in
2003: Insuring Against a Failure of Professional Responsibility, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 271, 274 (2003). Offenkrantz cites to Professor Stephen K. Huber's observation that
"law students received little, if any, exposure to arbitration during their legal education."
Id. (citing Stephen K. Huber, The Role of Arbitrator: Conflicts of Interest, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 915, 919 (2001)).
56 Offenkrantz, supra note 55, at 272.
57 Id. at 273.
58 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
59 Offenkrantz, supra note 55, at 275.
60 Reuben, supra note 7, at 863-64.
61 Id. at 864. "Breyer articulated a relatively specific definition of 'questions of
arbitrability' that would be subject to what he called 'the interpretive rule of First
Options'... Breyer also took care to delineate the questions that do not fall within this
'more limited scope' of arbitrability." Id.
62 Id.
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at all.63 Thus, the issue was the scope of arbitrability, not arbitrability itself.64
Questions of scope receive a presumption in favor of arbitrability. 65 Here, the
presumption in favor of arbitration dodges the harm that is posed in cases
where arbitrability is at issue-when the parties have already agreed that
arbitration is the method to resolve their dispute, there can be no issue of an
arbitrator or a court forcing the parties to do something they do not want to
do.66
C. Waiver to Judicial Access
An issue conditionally raised in First Options was ignored by the Court
in Howsam. The Court did not address the issue of waiver.67 First Options
stated that waiver of judicial access must be "clear and unmistakable" but
failed to state just what expressions would meet that standard.68 The Court
did not address Howsam's argument that this standard was met by a broad
arbitration clause, or, in the alternative, by the broad arbitration clause
combined with documents "that incorporate the arbitration of arbitrability
issues into the arbitration provision by reference." 69
1. Waiver Through a Broad Arbitration Clause
In both First Options and Howsam, the parties had blanket arbitration
clauses, generally stating that "all disputes arising under the contract" are
subject to arbitration.70 Howsam argued that this clause provided "clear and
63 Id. at 866.
64 Id.
65 Id.
[T]he only disagreement was over who was to decide the 'eligibility' issue in
this particular dispute. . . such scope issues receive a presumption in favor of
arbitrability-a presumption in this case fortified by a recognition of the unique
institutional competence of NASD arbitrators to resolve questions over the meaning
of NASD rules.
Id.
66 Id. Justice Breyer's opinion states that the type of questions to be decided by
courts are those in which the parties would have expected judicial intervention, "where
reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate
a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate." Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-84.
67 Reuben, supra note 7, at 866.
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Petitioner's Brief at 32-37, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79 (2002) (No. 01-800)).
70 Id. at 867.
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unmistakable" intent to waive the right to judicial determinations of
arbitrability questions. 71 In First Options, the Court did not expressly state
that such clauses met or failed to meet the "clear and unmistakable" standard,
but implied that blanket arbitration clauses would be unlikely to clearly
waive judicial access. 72 The failure of the Court to ignore this argument in
two cases should likely be read to mean that the argument is invalid.73
2. Waiver by Incorporation
In Howsam, the parties submitted to a broad arbitration clause. However,
since the Court would likely refuse to recognize this clause as evidence of the
parties' intent to waive the right to judicial access, Howsam further
submitted that the clause, read in conjunction with the incorporation of the
NASD rules, should constitute "clear and unmistakable" intent to waive
access. 74 Since NASD Rule 10304 stated that arbitrators shall interpret the
NASD Code, this presumption was incorporated by reference into the
original agreement, bolstering the notion that the parties had waived the right
to judicial determinations of arbitrability. 75 The Court did not address this
claim to waiver. However, if the Court had adopted such a standard for
meeting the waiver requirement, this would undermine the policy that parties
should not be forced to arbitrate a matter that they never intended to
arbitrate. 76 The failure to address these issues of waiver appear to support the
idea that "clear and unmistakable" means just that-"an express and explicit
waiver of court access rights." 77
71 Id.
72 Id. Read together with Howsam, the Court's failure in First Options to recognize
that a broad arbitration clause would meet the waiver standard would lead to the
understanding that such a clause does not constitute waiver. Id. at 867-68.




77 Id. at 867, 869. With regards to waiver by incorporation, Reuben states, "an
incorporated expression of intent is one step removed from the arbitration provision
itself, mere boilerplate referenced by more boilerplate. While such a procedure would
clearly be more efficient... First Options was quite clear in rejecting efficiency
rationales in favor of what appears to be a more specific case-by-case analysis." Id. at
869.
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V. CONCLUSION
While the Court's holding provides a more solid understanding of the
difference between substantive and procedural arbitrability questions, several
issues are left open. First, the general presumption in favor of arbitration may
require reexamination in light of education and complexity issues. Second,
the failure of the Court to address the issue of waiver may force the Court to
revisit cases substantially similar to First Options and Howsam to decide that
issue. The Howsam decision, however, will provide some guidance to
practitioners, arbitrators, and courts when they attempt to interpret and apply
ADR contract provisions.
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